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A B S T R A C T   
Most The goal of this article is to analyse the participatory process of 
development projects. Drawing upon my professional experience in a project 
called Pre-Poor Slum Intergration Project (PPSIP) which was based in 
Comilla, Bangladesh - I argue that development projects dominated by rigid 
power structures inside and in-between institutions inhibits community 
participation that reflects the actual need of the beneficiary group; and as 
happened in this case, produce results that do not serve the people in real 
need but rather only serve the purpose of the institutions that manage the 
project, more so the institutions having higher degrees of power. In this article 
I try to combine insights gained from our field experience and literature study 
on post-politics and power in planning in order to sketch out the stakeholder 
institutions'  interest, capacity and enrolment in order to understand how 
socio-relational dynamics as opposed to technical procedures shaped the 
project. In this project participation from the community was ritualistic- 
serving only a face-value, the operational team on the field were  devoid of 
power to take important decisions or challenge the institutional framework 
that they were part of, and at the same time institutions with higher degrees of 
decision making power were not sufficiently involved with the realities of the 
field. I conclude that in order to make participatory process really work, 
involved institutions should not limit their efforts in repetitive consensus 
building exercises based on pre-conceived ideas and traditional methods of 
community development. 
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1. Introduction  
 Bangladesh is a densely populated country. 
Rapid urbanization has put significant strain on 
cities and towns of Bangladesh. According to a 
2009 study, around five million housing units are 
needed in Bangladesh to address housing 
shortage, and majority of population without 
adequate housing are from the low income 
group (NHA, 2014). Housing is predominantly 
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developed by private market in Bangladeshi 
cities and the market is driven by profit. A large 
portion of the population cannot avail good 
quality housing available in the market; that is 
when the illegal settlements or slums come in 
the picture.  
There are around 50,000 illegal and low income 
settlements in Bangladesh’s 29 largest 
municipalities (NHA, 2014). Poor housing 
materials, high rent, limited access to public 
services, densely crowded and unsanitary living 
conditions, lack of tenure security etc. are 
some characteristic problems of these 
settlements. The settlements lack healthy living 
environment that is necessary for well-being of 
adults and children. By now it is well established 
that slum eviction is a violation of basic human 
rights and it involves high social and economic 
costs. The government is becoming 
increasingly aware that slum-development/ 
integration efforts can be the appropriate 
approach.  
The government has attempted to perform 
integrated approaches to slum development 
with the help of international development 
organizations such as UNDP, UK Aid etc. Urban 
Partnership for Poverty Reduction, in short, UPPR 
is such a project which runs in 21 cities of 
Bangladesh. In seven years until 2015, UPPR has 
successfully mobilized and empowered slum 
communities (especially the women) to 
develop their own savings, infrastructure etc. 
With UPPR, some communities have now 
started to also develop housing (UPPR, 2011). 
PPSIP (Pro-Poor Slum Integration Project) started 
with an intention to expand UPPR’s efforts with 
housing development.  
Participatory design/planning is a central 
element in many contemporary slum 
integration initiatives as in the case of PPSIP. 
The main objective of such participatory 
projects is to assist disadvantaged individuals 
and groups in changing their own living 
condition; and to do this by valorizing local 
knowledge and resources. Participatory 
design/planning projects bring people from 
different social-educational-financial 
backgrounds around the table in negotiating 
terms. Often the interests and enrolment are 
too difficult to be determined in preliminary 
phases. Eventually even the most community-
centered/ democratic project might derail 
from its goals due to obdurate power hierarchy 
among stakeholders. Through this research I try 
to understand and decode related 
stakeholders’ and project participants’ interest, 
capacity and enrolment in different projects 
and explain whether or how structures and 
dynamics of power relations in these projects 
serves the beneficiary group.   
 
1.1. Research methods 
This is a qualitative research. The main insights 
of the study is drawn from my professional 
experiences in the project PPSIP and my 
involvement in other activities with the 
architects who were involved in this project. A 
vital part of empirical understanding comes 
from active participation in facilitating and 
participating in workshops, community visits, 
interviewing locals, architects and NGO 
representatives etc. Through extensive report 
writing and journal keeping, I have made 
observations on how participatory processes 
are carried out, how the communities and 
community leaders respond to programs, or 
how professionals respond to communities’ 
concerns and so on. Active involvement in 
other slum development projects as 
community architect have also allowed me to 
sketch out the problems in a broader scale and 
also understand ethical positions and interests 
of different actors in similar projects. A number 
of research questions which have guided this 
research: 
1.How accurately do the project understand 
the beneficiary community's social reality, 
needs and resources? How far do the 
processes and mechanisms of the project 
resonate with community's needs and 
aspiration?  
2.How is power exercised by different actors in 
the process 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Strategic Spatial Planning 
 The interpretation of planning systems with an 
actor-structure perspective by Van den Broeck 
and Servillo in their article, The Social 
Construction of Planning Systems: A Strategic-
Relational Institutionalist Approach provides 
with an understanding of dialectic interplay of 
agency and institutions shaping the specificities 
of planning systems, and thus influencing 
external changes (Van Den Broeck & Servillo, 
2012). According to the authors, along with its 
technical role of economic and social 
development, changed courses of spatial 
planning also focus on democratic decision-
making process, empower weaker groups; 
changes in actors and social groups and their 
positions and practices also bring complex 
changes in relevant institutions and agency. 
These dynamics can be interpreted as the 
effect of non-dominant groups challenging the 
dominant group in planning system. They argue 
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that dialectic among hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic groups have transformative power 
in planning system, because counter-
hegemonic groups are able to bring changes 
in institutional frames through action.  
Albrechts in his writings about Strategic Spatial 
Planning has insisted a shift in planning style 
that is based on designing “shared futures and 
the development and promotion of common 
assets.” The essence of SSP is also to find 
alternative approaches to “instrumental 
rationality". This alternative way refers to value 
rationality, a method of making dialogues 
where value based images, which are 
embedded in specific contexts, are generated 
collectively, validated by belief, practice and 
experience. This method is a reaction to the 
trend of making “future that extrapolated the 
past, and maintains the status quo”. This 
approach includes reaching the ‘other’ part of 
the population, who are victim of prejudice 
and exclusion; and giving them the power to 
create their own image, and to take into 
account the “unequal balances of power” 
(Albrechts, 2004). 
 
2.2. Power in planning  
In Albrechts’ study of power in planning, he 
argues that planning is essentially shaped by 
complicated power relations and because the 
dominant interests are not necessarily always is 
in line with the “force of better argument”; the 
process of negotiations among plan-making 
actors, decision-making actors and 
implementation actors usually results in a 
consensus which neutralizes important/ 
significant opinions. 
An important reflection is also built with 
Albrechts’ view on citizen’s ambivalence on 
power system; according to him, the citizens 
are not convinced of the power of informal 
structures and frameworks in shaping the flow 
of events in planning field. He establishes that, 
although dominant power relations are not 
easy to change, empowerment has the 
potential to support collective efforts to 
change such relations. Albrechts argues that 
spatial planning, with the help of a number of 
mediating instruments and processes can take 
steps forward to achieve participative 
democracy. (Albrecths, 2013). 
 
2.3. Post-Politics 
Our experience in PPSIP has inspired us to think 
about participatory planning in a critical way. 
Sometime participatory planning becomes a 
buzzword, something which certifies a project 
as socially sustainable. Reading on post politics 
has served us with understanding of why only 
consensus building is not enough in establishing 
rights and justice. In his presentation on post-
politics, Metzger explains how post-politics 
refers to a number of aspects of contemporary 
planning practices that are deficient in many 
perspectives; these practices have an 
uncritical attitude towards partnership 
governance and participatory consensus 
building. Although the process of participation 
is supposed to bring clarity of opinion from 
different actor groups; participatory planning 
might instead result in nightmarishly complex 
governance arrangements, making it difficult 
to clearly understand, analyze and reproduce 
the processes with success. Because many 
different actors are involved and their interest, 
stake and enrolment is not always clearly 
sketched out, it becomes difficult to assign 
authority to actions. The literature on post-
politics also highlights how participatory 
planning might sometimes be used as a mean 
to suppress dissent on difficult issues; this 
happens because all actors sitting around a 
table are not given equal right of say what 
they have in mind. Thus in reality, participatory 
process only serve a part of the purpose, not 
the whole of it- it might bring people who were 
deprived of right of opinion in the scene, but 
the agenda of discussion might not allow 
everyone to properly voice their concern, and 
at the end of the day, it’s the most powerful 
actor whose interest will be served. This way 
consensus building only works as a way of 
social control by reducing the possibility for 
other actors to oppose the most powerful 
actor.  
An important aspect of the post-political 
approach is the recognition of this conflict of 
interest and accepting that the political 
difference should not be suppressed, rather 
expressed on public platform, so that they are 
“explored and articulated in ways that can 
contribute to “taming” potentially violent 
antagonism into democratically productive 
agonism” (Metzger, 2016). Agonism allows for 
“fundamentally opposed political ideals and 
interests to play out against each other in 
democratically acceptable forms based on – if 
not sympathy or understanding – at least a 
mutual recognition of legitimacy and respect 
for difference” (Metzger, 2016).  
 
Irina Velicu and Maria Kaika’s paper animates 
the story of years long anti-mining struggles in 
Rosia Montana, Romania with a theoretical 
basis adopted from Jacques Rancière’s 
writings on postpolitics. Rancière argues about 
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consensual politics that, “within an established 
framework, disagreement can only be 
articulated around opinions and values or 
around best solutions for a contested situation. 
The situation itself, the framework itself within 
which this dialogue operates (e.g. Continuous 
development, neoliberalism, etc.) is not 
(supposed to be) contested” (Velicu & Kaika, 
2014, p.3). So, to make changes that matter, it 
is important that the framework within which a 
project operates should remain flexible to some 
extent. 
 
3. Background of Pro-Poor Slum Integration 
Project 
3.1. Pro-Poor Slum Integration Project 
Pro-Poor Slum Integration Project or PPSIP 
started in 2014 and aims to complete 
implementation in 2021. The analysis of the 
case will firstly illustrate the thematic guideline 
of the project which is extracted from multiple 
reports (NHA, 2014) and then identify the 
complexities of implementation in the first 
several months of the pilot phase of the 
project. 
The objective of Pro-Poor Slum Integration 
Project is to improve shelter and living 
conditions in selected low income and informal 
settlements in a number of municipalities in 
Bangladesh. The project also aims to develop 
infrastructure, e.g. road, drainage etc. in these 
neighborhoods. An additional focus of this 
project is to introduce collaborative learning in 
poverty stricken urban areas with the means of 
Community Support Centers. The beneficiary 
communities and municipalities are selected 
through strategic steps and the project aims to 
scale up the development endeavours to 
additional municipalities in the future through 
demonstration. 
 
3.1.1. Integration of policies 
The project reflects Bangladesh’s Seventh Five 
Year Plan. According to this, “specific priorities 
of  housing development are: (i) enabling land 
markets to work efficiently; (ii) improving the 
mechanism for financing housing and (iii) 
encouraging participation of the private 
sector, community based organizations, and 
non-government organizations to participate in 
service provision, particularly through policies 
to support inclusion.”  (Seventh Five Year Plan 
(FY16-20) , n.d.) The National Housing Policy 
(1993/2004) recognizes the rights of the 
inhabitants in slums and informal settlements. 
This further focuses on the development of 
alternative housing supply programs to address 
the needs of the economically marginalized 
group.  
3.1.2. Community driven approach 
This project is designed with a community-
driven and people centered approach. It 
adopts the Asian Coalition for Community 
Action- ACCA approach practiced in different 
countries of South-east Asia. The approach is 
based on building funding capability within the 
community and empowering community 
people to improve their own living conditions. 
ACCA includes a people centered approach 
to slum upgrading, including tenure and 
housing rights. The first step is community 
mobilization and organization- gradually 
building social cohesion through collective 
action 
  
Figure 1: Diagrammatic representation of Actor relationship and enrolment in PPSIP. 
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ACCA then provides loans for larger housing 
projects and supports communities with 
architectural and planning assistance for site 
layout and design. This big and small funds 
goes to a city as a set of funds in order to make 
city-wide development. In this mechanism, in 
order to sustain the process, communities are 
mobilized to be connected by networks so they 
can take collaborative action towards 
common habitat development goals. The 
solution comes through forming larger- scale 
revolving funds; all involved communities take 
part in it – these funds are called community 
development funds (CDFs) and they may 
operate at different levels: the district level, city 
level, provincially or even nationally.  
ACCA funds pass through a city level CDF 
(Community Development Fund) rather than 
going directly to the community. This CDFs can 
also be supplemented by a welfare fund and 
an insurance fund. CDF also serve as the 
institutionalization of community processes 
while it incorporates multiple different 
stakeholders, such as community members, 
academics, NGOs, and government officials. 
ACCA supports communities in acquiring 
formal land title through negotiated purchases, 
or securing land grants or long term leases 
through communication with land authorities. 
ACCA encourages the communities to 
develop their savings, so they can avail other 
sources of finance (e.g. Bank loans). Successful 
communities are linked with other communities 
on the city level which provides them the 
opportunity to learn from each other’s 
experiences, links city wide savings efforts and 
through this, communities feel empowered and 
connected. (ARCHER, 2012) 
 
 3.1.3. Partnership with UPPR 
The project is designed to work with  cohesive 
community groups of UPPR, who already has a 
history of savings, and are experienced in 
planning and developing small scale 
infrastructure projects, e.g. neighbourhood 
road, toilets etc. Urban Partnerships for Poverty 
Reduction Project (UPPR) started in 2000 with 
organization and mobilization of the 
community, savings and livelihoods programs, 
and simple infrastructure development through 
community contracting with awards of small 
grants. Until now, in 21 different municipalities 
of the country, UPPR communities manage 
30,000 primary groups organized under 2,588 
community development committees. With 
community collaboration, they build 
community action plans to implement 
livelihood programs and basic infrastructure 
development. Up to date, UPPR has over 5 
million USD savings rotating among 26,000 
community based savings and credit groups. 
UPPR started in many municipality an effort to 
control viability of community based lending 
products for housing, this is called Community 
Housing Development Funds (CHDF). The PPSIP 
project aims to broaden these operations with 
the means of housing and further infrastructure 
development. 
 
3.1.4. Institutional plurality 
The national-scale project draws on expertise 
and capacities from different institutions. The 
project fund (a total of USD 50 Million) is lent to 
Bangladesh Bank by International 
Development Association (IDA). In this project, 
the housing finance for the urban poor comes 
through community based lending models. 
That requires development of a number of 
tailored funding products (e.g., personal, joint 
liability, group guarantee etc.) with which 
households will get access to credits as 
qualified borrowers, the financial models are to 
be developed by Palli Karma Sayahak 
Foundation (PKSF). National Housing Authority 
(NHA) is responsible for employing technical 
consultants for environmental and social 
assessment and implementation of the project. 
For the pilot phase of the project, NHA 
employed a number of institutions affiliated 
with BRAC University- C3ER (Climate Change 
and Environmental Research) , a team of 
architects and a team of social scientists from 
BID (Brac Institute of Development).  
 
3.2. Selection of communities 
The pilot phase started with an aim to test 
feasibility of the project. This required selecting 
communities which will help the project to 
succeed in the pilot phase, so that the efforts 
can later be more or less replicated for the next 
communities and next towns.  
Through many stages of shortlisting five towns 
were selected- Sirajgonj, Narayangonj, Comilla, 
Barisal and Dinajpur. The consultant teams 
visited the five towns to rank them in an order 
of ‘readiness’ of each town, so that they know 
from in which town the pilot phase should start. 
The consultant team shared the prospects of 
the project with local authorities (District 
comissioner, mayor etc.); ranked prospective 
communities through meetings with community 
leaders and visited communities. From this, the 
consultant team prepared a list of strengths 
and threats for each town. Both in the cities of 
Comilla and Sirajgonj, there is good 
cooperation within communities and among 
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communities and local government. However, 
in Comilla a new City Corporation masterplan 
was in the process and starting the PPSIP 
project in Comilla could mean incorporation of 
slum development initiative in the masterplan, 
and that could facilitate in creating a good 
example of urban planning for other cities with 
slum problems.  
The initial activities which led to selection of the 
first five communities were meeting with UPPRP 
cluster leaders, local NGOs and ward 
councillors. Through meeting these local 
representatives, 71 communities were 
shortlisted. After this shortlisting, the selection 
criteria were revised in order to find 
communities which could increase the 
likelihood of success in the pilot phase, these 
criteria were, in order of importance: 
availability of land, performance of savings 
and credit scheme and possibility of 
demonstration of various housing options 
(defined by geographical quality, 
morphological setting of household etc.).  
With the revised criteria, 11 high ranked 
communities were chosen from this list and 
categorized on the basis of some 
characteristics or issues- pond-side 
communities, lake-side communities, 
embankment-side communities and socially-
disadvantaged communities. This 
categorization was made with an attempt of 
forming networks of communities, so that as the 
project progresses, communities can easily find 
solutions to their problems with the help of their 
network.  
Eventually, through further revisions of 
indicators, five communities were chosen for 
the pilot phase. These communities are: 
Molobhipara Baburchibari, Shongraish, 
Hatipukurpar, Shubhopur Gangpar and Uttor 
Bhatpara.  
Though the inclinations of different groups are 
not explicit, it can be imagined that varying 
interests in different stakeholders led to a time 
consuming trial and error process of selection. 
Regardless of what consultant teams, city 
representatives and community representatives 
suggested, a major deciding factor that was 
set by the design of the program was 
beneficiary communities’ ability to repay loan 
and their access to legal land. How the 
deciding power of certain stakeholders played 
role in the selection process  is further 
elaborated in the next section. 
 
 
 
3.3. Reflections on the community selection 
process 
Legal access to land and capacity to repay 
loan were two major criteria in the community 
selection process. However, in the communities 
of Comilla and Sirajgonj, it is rarely the case 
that a family who has legal and private 
ownership and are well-off enough to repay 
the loan easily- are in dire need to build a new 
house. Comparing to the ultra-poor slum 
communities, these families have good houses 
which only need improvements or repairing. 
According to Islam, the households in 
communities of Sirajgonj privately owned their 
lots. The income of the majority of these 
household is about 30,000 BDT while the target 
group decided in the project was of families 
with monthly income of BDT 7000-15000. Those 
families only needed improvements, such as a 
good kitchen or a pucca (permanent) roof. 
(Islam, 2016) 
The infrastructural improvement objectives 
included: 1. Developing access with improved 
roads 2. Ensuring electricity supply 3. Ensuring 
gas supply 4. Developing proper waste 
management 4. Developing drainage for 
waste-water 5. Ensuring water supply. The first 
two communities (Shongraish and 
Moulobhipara) to work with already had basic 
provision of all these infrastructure, except 
good drainage and waste disposal system. 
According to the project design only 
communities who take part in the housing loan 
program will receive free of cost infrastructural 
improvement support. So eventually, the 
project was practically functioning like a bank 
housing loan program addressed to lower-
middle/middle income families, instead of a 
slum improvement project. The consultants on 
field were increasingly uncomfortable with this 
pattern, but nevertheless, they would continue 
with the project if the community agreed to 
the financial scheme that was presented.   
A number of communities without land security 
were highly ranked in the selection process 
because of cohesion in the community, 
willingness etc. In spite of being the least 
developed in terms of infrastructure, housing, 
land security; those communities were not 
chosen. It was decided that in the pilot phase 
the project will work with only communities with 
legal access to land because the time period 
for pilot phase (2 years) was too short for any 
kind of acquisition of land or mitigation 
addressing land conflict. Another major 
selection criterion was presence of community 
cohesiveness and willingness to take part in the 
project. The communities were always 
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approached through the UPPR leaders and 
mostly their cooperation and involvement was 
taken as indicative of the ‘readiness’ of 
community. Naturally, UPPR leaders’ interest 
were very much associated with the programs 
and achievements of UPPR. Through UPPR 
programs, they have built saving activities and 
performed infrastructural projects (communal 
toilets, communal water taps, improves roads 
etc.). These processes have gradually 
improved the communities’ socio-physical 
environments, and equally importantly, 
empowered the community women by 
capacitating them with leadership roles and so 
on. These leaders who worked for the 
communities for many years seemed to be 
feeling out of place with the new project when 
the programs of PPSIP were not in line of UPPR 
projects. 
Although the selection involved local people, 
eventually it was top-down process. Producing 
some visible result (as housing) in the pilot 
phase would be necessary to produce a 
demonstration effect for the project, and 
hence the criteria were designed in a way to 
achieve that goal; but some criterion had a 
strong focus on the interest of the Bank rather 
than the communities. In other words, the 
“community-driven” project could not 
eventually motivate any community to 
continue with the project. 
 
3.4. Context of Comilla 
Comilla is a district situated in the east of 
Bangladesh. The urban population of Comilla is 
7,07,597 and population density is 1712/ sq. km 
(BBS, 2014). The landscape of Comilla is defined 
by water bodies; rivers (Little Feni and Gomoti), 
natural lakes and man-made ponds of small 
and large size. While the water bodies served 
as water source for city neighborhoods in the 
past, with the introduction of piped water, the 
developed neighborhoods do not need to use 
them now. Many ponds are now a days being 
filled for developing structures. However, for the 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, the ponds still 
remain a source of water for household 
purposes- cleaning clothes, utensils, bathing 
etc. Locals from slum communities say that, the 
pond banks serve as gathering spaces for 
them, especially in summer when power-cuts 
are frequent and dense slum settlements are 
difficult to live in. The ponds serve as an 
important source of water also in case of fire-
hazards, especially for neighborhoods which 
are not easily accessible to fire trucks. 
Despite the city’s role in shaping the history of 
the country (and of the region before the 
formation of the Republic) over many centuries 
through its economic and cultural presence; 
the city has received little urban, infrastructural 
or technological upgrade in recent decades. Ill 
equipped to function as a modern city, it now 
struggles to cope with aggressive urban 
development. As with many cities in 
Bangladesh, whose infrastructural and resource 
capacities are collapsing under the weight of 
ever growing demands to deliver economic 
value and to take in rapidly increasing 
population, the city of Comilla is being regularly 
cut and stitched to enhance its economic and 
industrial production capacity and to 
accommodate the growing number of migrant 
inhabitants. These modifications on the 
cityscape have taken a heavy toll on the 
quality of life of individuals and entire 
neighborhoods: more so among those less 
privileged. 
 
 
Figure 2: Skyline of Comilla 
 
 
Figure 3: Moulobhipara Baburchibari community. 
 
3.5. Project activities on the field 
Shongraish and Moulobhipara were two of the 
first communities who participated in the 
project. Both communities have savings 
committees with UPPR and have developed 
their infrastructure (especially communal toilets 
and roads) over past years with UPPR 
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development projects.  The communities were 
first briefed in detail about the project- its 
objectives and program. Then, based on 
discussions with the UPPR leaders, the architects 
fixed project boundaries for each community, 
i.e. parts of a community were chosen as 
defined by their geographical characteristics, 
or bounded by infrastructures. However, a 
possible extended area was also decided for 
future consideration. 
With the help of ARCHITECTS' TEAMconsultants, 
the communities then prepared community 
maps to locate the respective positions of their 
houses, toilets, kitchens etc., type of houses 
(permanent/temporary) and ownership of lots. 
Through informal community workshop, 
inhabitants also discussed what improvements 
they desire in their living environment. These 
processes were performed in community 
courtyards or houses. While a part of the team 
were involved in mapping and collaborating 
directly with the communities, other parts of the 
team were involved in extracting and 
analysing maps from GIS databases, reviewing 
and appropriating building codes etc.  
Along with these activities, land experts from 
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS' TEAM started to extract and 
analyze land status of other communities 
(Shubhopur Gangpar, Uttor Bhatpara etc.) on 
the list in order to facilitate future negotiations 
about land. However, in spite of numerous 
attempts from the SOCIAL SCIENTISTS' TEAM 
and ARCHITECTS' TEAM, negotiations with the 
Land Ministry could not be made because 
local government was not very helpful. It was 
difficult to make negotiations for land transfer 
from other ministries to housing ministry. The 
project applied to the Prime Minister to 
facilitate land negotiation processes, but didn’t 
receive any response. 
During community meetings, the consultant 
teams shared with the communities about 
successful community-led slum improvement 
projects in other South-east Asian countries 
(Burma, Fiji, Vietnam, India and Philippines). 
Through sharing about successful examples, 
architects' team attempted to create dialogue 
with the community about the importance of 
combined efforts of professionals and locals in 
creating cost-effective design solutions. 
 
Figure 4: Community map of Moulobhipara (NHA, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 5:  Consulting design with house owner in 
Moulobhipara (NHA, 2014) 
 
3.1. Financial mechanism 
According to the financial scheme, one 
household will be granted a maximum amount 
of BDT 2,00,000 (USD 2548) as loan which they 
have to repay in 5 years with an interest rate of 
15%. A household who takes a BDT 1,00,000 
(USD 1274). loan would have to repay a total of 
BDT 1,42,740 (USD 2379). This fund will be 
disbursed from World Bank as loans, through 
Bangladesh Bank and then a local NGO and 
finally to a saving committee that the 
communities would form for this project.  
In Shongraish, the first response to the numbers 
was that the interest rate is too high for them. In 
this project architects and social teams were 
the only group directly communicating with the 
community and naturally, because finance is 
not their core skill, neither of this group had very 
clear understanding of how the financial 
mechanism works. PKSF and the finance team 
from BRAC University only agreed to 
collaborate from Dhaka. With the absence of a 
financial team to explain, decode or modify 
the financial scheme properly, the consultant 
teams on the field attempted to broaden their 
skills on this issue with the help of visiting 
consultants, studying financial models from 
other projects etc.  
 
 
 
  
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN AFFAIRS, 3(2), 156-165 / 2019 
 
 
Emerald Upoma Baidya          164 
 
Conflict arising on interest rate became a 
recurrent event during a particular phase in 
Comilla. Although the project derived its 
participatory design approaches from ACCA 
projects, a major difference between this 
project and any ACCA was the funding 
mechanism. In ACCA funded projects the fund 
reaches to a city-wide community network in 
the form of donation. Therefore, when it is 
disbursed within community household in the 
form of loan the interest rate is lower and also 
because the loan is repaid to their own 
community-network, the participants are less 
hesitant to repay the loan with an interest. 
Islam, one of the community architects says, 
“We were talking about examples like Baan 
Mankong, Bang Bua and CODI, we didn’t 
probably yet realize the biggest difference 
between PPSIP and those examples were the 
funding mechanism. In Thailand the 
communities were receiving grants, and here 
the community was offered loan. That makes 
all the difference. We were too focused on the 
physical product, the housing.” - (Islam, 2016). 
Eventually no productive dialogue took place 
between the community and PPSIP and the 
consultant teams decided that before the 
financial scheme is revised to fit communities’ 
affordability, it was of no use to design/plan 
further along with the community. However, 
the architects' teamcarried on with designing 
infrastructure, housing prototypes, cost 
estimation etc. so that they can further consult 
with the community when and if the conflict is 
resolved and the social scientists' team would 
continue with the social awareness program.  
The consultant teams didn’t have any clear 
idea about the financial mechanism even 
when the project moved to the next city 
Sirajgonj after working in Comilla for almost an 
year. According to Islam, the architects' team 
was aware that discussing financial mechanism 
in detail will only complicate the situation, so 
they only performed programs on housing and 
land. Design workshops, community mapping, 
interviews etc. In order to create dialogue with 
the families about their aspiration of housing 
improvement within a cost frame of BDT 200000 
(USD 2550) per household. 
 
3.7. Disputes among different stakeholders 
One of the reasons why the community lost 
trust in the project, was because too many 
stakeholders were involved in this project and 
they visited the community at different times 
with different agenda. The values, working 
method and language of communication 
were different in all these different teams.  
Conflict among consultant teams, community 
leaders and current UPPR officials proved to be 
strongest factor for certain disruptions along 
the project. The UPPR town manager, the 
official responsible for supervising UPPR efforts in 
communities, although verbally agreed to 
collaborate with PPSIP, was not fully convinced 
of the importance of PPSIP in “his” 
communities. He complained that he did not 
feel enough involved in the project. His 
dissension proved to be a deciding factor of 
UPPR leaders’ non-cooperation with the 
project, just as the leaders’ non-cooperation 
with the project closed the line of 
communication with the communities. When 
architects' teamattempted to bring ACCA 
fund for housing and infrastructure 
improvement in communities out of UPPR 
network, the disagreement from town 
manager leaders grew even stronger because 
this effort seemed to him as a token of 
contesting UPPR’s capacity.  
The different consultant teams in PPSIP could 
not fully utilize the potential of a multi-
disciplinary professional environment. Only 
architects' team and social scientists'  teams 
were mainly working in the field. Except 
periodical meetings and site visits, the other 
stake holders (representatives and professionals 
from NHA) were not involved in the field for 
long periods of time. This resulted in conflicted 
understanding of the context, goal and 
therefore compromising of the field 
professional’s capacity.  
According to Islam, the leading team on the 
field was the architects’ team, and they were 
not fully equipped with the vast array of 
organisational skill that was required for a 
project like this. The limits of their skills were 
constantly challenged by cumbersome 
bureaucratic processes. The mind-set and 
working method of several groups were very 
different. The architects' team was mobilized by 
an ambitious humanistic result, the finance 
team was too pragmatic to find an alternative 
mechanism. An integrated approach of socio-
technical innovation was missing (Islam, 2016). 
  
4. Conclusion 
The design of the project addresses grave 
issues as housing and infrastructure crisis in 
urban poor, intends to adopt a community-
driven approach in integrated slum 
development. Yet, in the pilot phase 
coordination between communities and the 
project has failed in unfortunate ways. Two 
main reasons can be sketched out  in order to 
understand why this happened. 
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a. Participatory design/planning was seen in an 
uncritical way: The notion of participatory 
design was accepted as if when the 
community participates in decision making 
processes, everything falls in place magically. 
Even if community always stays in the center of 
the discussion, the project actually failed to 
measure their financial capacity,  eventually it 
was made sure that the Banks profit through 
this project. Not only participation from the 
community was ritualistic, serving only a face-
value, the task force on the field was also put in 
a complete dead-end situation, they were 
always under pressure to meet World Bank’s 
criteria.  Even though consultant teams were 
free to take decisions on the field, practically 
they were merely executives offered with 
remuneration, devoid of power to make the 
really important decisions or challenge the 
institutional framework that they were part of.  
b. The interest and enrolment of different 
stakeholders were not realistically sketched out: 
The design of the project had foreseen high risk 
around stakeholder participation and 
institutional consensus. This risk could not be 
averted. The unequal power dynamics could 
be changed if there were less number of 
stakeholders involved. With repetitive  
consensus building exercises, it was difficult to 
assign responsibility to any one actor for an 
action, the consultant teams on the field were 
completely perplexed in the process of 
considering every related stakeholders’ 
interests before and after any activities they 
carried out on the field. Although World Bank, 
NHA, PKSF etc. had more power in taking 
decisions, their enrolment in the project was 
not sufficient. On the other hand, the task force 
on the field was responsible for continuously 
reporting to these stakeholders. Although they 
could well realize how these dynamics were 
affecting the project negatively, there weren’t 
any stage available which allowed to flexibly 
negotiate these inequalities when the project 
already started; the power inequalities were 
too strong to mediate and the consultant 
teams could not deviate the fixed structure, 
although unlike the niche development 
projects, the architects did not have to search 
for funds etc. and had institutional support, 
they failed to create any real impact on the 
field. 
It is agreeable that the project deals with 
urgent planning issues and started as a way 
forward to incorporate societal changes into 
the country’s planning field, but it certainly will 
take alternative efforts to bring real change in 
the field in future.   
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